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Abstract
Background Current data on the risk of transmission of
2009 H1N1 Influenza in public transportation systems
(e.g., public trains, busses, airplanes) are conflicting. The
main transmission route of this virus is thought to be via
droplets, but airborne transmission has not been completely
ruled out.
Methods This is a contact tracing investigation of a
young woman subsequently diagnosed with the 2009 H1N1
Influenza virus who was symptomatic during a long-dis-
tance bus trip from Spain to Switzerland. Fever and cough
had begun 24 h earlier, 2 h before she stepped onto a bus
for a long-distance trip. After the 2009 H1N1 virus had
been confirmed in the patient, the other bus travellers were
contacted by telephone on day 7 and 10 after the bus trip.
Results Of the 72 individuals travelling on the bus with
the H1N1-infected young woman, 52 (72%) could be
contacted. Only one of these 52 developed fever, with
onset of symptoms 3 days after the bus trip, and rRT-PCR
analysis of the nasopharyngeal swab showed the infection
to be caused by the 2009 H1N1 virus. One other person
complained of coughing 1 day after the bus trip, but
without fever, and no further investigation was carried out.
All other passengers remained without fever, coughing, or
arthralgia. The risk of transmission was calculated as
1.96% (95% confidence interval 0–5.76%).
Conclusion The transmission rate of 2009 H1N1 Influ-
enza was low on a long-distance bus trip.
Introduction
We report here a contact tracing investigation of a young
woman with confirmed 2009 H1N1 Influenza who was
symptomatic during a long-distance bus trip from Spain to
Switzerland. Up to 10 August 2009, 56% of confirmed
Swiss cases of 2009 H1N1 Influenza were due to infection
outside of the country, with only 14% postulated to be due
to transmission in Switzerland itself [1]. The principle
transmission mode of 2009 N1N1 influenza is still under
debate. Analysis of cough revealed that [99.9% of the
expectorated particles are[8 lm [2] and therefore defined
as droplets. Particles in the size range of 5–10 lm have to
shown to be capable of penetrating deeply into the tra-
cheobronchial region (50% of 10-lm particles), but for
particles [20 lm, there is essentially no penetration
beyond the trachea [3]. While aerosols remain in the air,
droplets fall to the ground, with a settling velocity that is in
proportion to their diameter [3]. Based on these known
facts, the main transmission route of 2009 H1N1 virus is
believed to be by droplet exposure of mucosal surfaces [4].
As such, the hallmarks of transmission precaution are good
hand hygiene and the wearing of gloves and surgical masks
[5]. However, airborne transmission by small particle
aerosols may also occur [3, 6]. As with most respiratory
pathogens, including influenza, the relative contribution of
each of these types of transmission has not been adequately
ascertained. Up to August 2010, the Centers of Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that health-
care personnel who are in close contact with patients with
suspected or confirmed 2009 H1N1 Influenza take respi-
ratory protection measures that are at least as protective as
a fit-tested disposable N95 respirator. Most authorities
recommended that persons with suspected 2009 H1N1
Influenza who are not severely ill should remain at home
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until they are at least 24 h without fever or symptoms of
fever to limit further transmissions. However, the produc-
tion and possible transmission of viral particles is possible
24 h before the first signs occur, and a substantial pro-
portion of seasonal influenza as well as the 2009 H1N1
Influenza is mild or even subclinical and not recognized by
the patient [7, 8]. These persons can be infectious for
others.
For hospitalized patients, strategies to prevent trans-
mission have been developed and standardized [9]. These
include administration of influenza vaccine, implementa-
tion of respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette, appropriate
management of ill healthcare workers, adherence to
infection control precautions for all patient-care activities
and aerosol-generating procedures, and implementation of
environmental and engineering infection control measures.
However, in the ambulatory setting, it may be difficult
to guarantee special waiting rooms for patients with sus-
pected 2009 H1N1 Influenza (or other respiratory patho-
gens). Furthermore, symptoms may not be obvious, so
these people are often placed in a waiting room together
with other patients, eventually using the same lavatories
and examination rooms. The risk of influenza transmission
in public areas (e.g., public trains, busses, and airplanes)
has not been defined, and clinical studies and mathematical
models show conflicting results [10–12]. Typical airborne
pathogens, such as tuberculosis, have been well studied,
but to date little is known on the influenza virus where the
main transmission route is either directly from person-to-
person via droplets, or indirectly via a contaminated sur-
face. On hard surfaces, the influenza virus is infective for
up to 24 h; the survival time is much shorter on cloth,
paper, and tissues, i.e., 8–12 h; on hands after transfer
from environmental sources, the virus survives for only
5 min [13].
Methods
On 1 August 2009, a 19-year-old female patient was
admitted to the emergency department of our hospital with
complaints of fever (39.2C), cough, and arthralgia. The
symptoms had begun 24 h earlier, just before she stepped
onto a long-distance bus in Spain to return to Switzerland
after a 1-week holiday. A nasopharyngeal swap was
obtained, and 2009 H1N1 Influenza was confirmed by real
time rRT-PCR, as previously described [14]. Confirmatory
testing and genotyping was performed by the World Health
Organization (WHO) collaborating reference center of
Influenza (Geneva, Switzerland). The transportation com-
pany was contacted, and a complete passenger list of all
those on the bus (72 passengers), with seating plan, was
obtained. These busses make one round-trip weekly,
collecting people from different parts in Spain and bringing
them to different parts of Switzerland. During the summer
of 2009, the infection rate of 2009 H1N1 Influenza was
significantly higher in Spain than in Switzerland. Attempts
were made to contact all passengers by telephone. When
this was successful, the passengers were asked whether
they had symptoms of fever (C38C), coughing, and/or
arthralgia, and if so, when these symptoms first appeared.
A suspected case was defined as the onset of fever (C38C)
and cough or sore throat [15]. According to the exposure
criteria published by the CDC on 1 May 2009, all pas-
sengers were included in the survey, as they had ‘‘travelled
to a community, which has one or more confirmed swine-
origin influenza A (H1N1) cases’’ [15]. Persons without
symptoms who did not feel feverish were not asked to take
their temperature. The first telephone call was made 6 days
after the passengers had returned from Spain. If no fever
had occurred by day 6, the persons were contacted a second
time on between days 10 and 13.
If no symptoms of influenza had presented by day 10
after the possible contagion during the bus trip, it was
considered that no infection had occurred. The bus was
double floored, 13.9 m length, with an integrated ventila-
tion system, air inlets on the roof, adjustable nozzles above
each passenger and venting in the front of the bus by
negative pressure, without air recirculation or HEPA-
filters.
The average age of the passengers contacted was
19.7 ± 7 years, of whom 18 (34.6%) were male.
Results
Data were available for 52/72 (72%) of the bus passengers;
the remainder could not be contacted after four attempts.
One person became ill on day 3 after the trip, and further
investigation revealed the presence of H1N1 virus by
rRT-PCR analysis of a nasopharyngeal swap. One other
person who also reported having symptoms of influenza in
Spain, even prior to boarding the bus, also tested positive
for H1N1. Genotyping of the two persons who were ill
during the bus trip could not identify a common source.
Unfortunately, the amount of the nucleic acid amplified
from the secondary case was too small to allow genotyping,
so transmission could not be confirmed by genotyping. One
other person complained of cough without fever that had
begun on day 3 after the return home from Spain but which
was still present on day 13. As fever was not present on
days 3 and 13, the case definition for suspected influenza
was not fulfilled and we postulated an unspecific viral
upper respiratory tract infection; however, no nasopha-
ryngeal swab was obtained from this individual. Six of the
individuals contacted complained of fever during the
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holiday in Spain, but no further investigation was made as
their symptoms had resolved at the time of the first tele-
phone call. Four of these six individuals also complained of
concomitant cough and arthralgia, while two of the six
reported fever and only cough.
The persons contacted spent their holiday at three dif-
ferent locations in six, one, and five different hotels,
respectively.
The six persons reporting fever during the holiday were
staying at four different hotels and two different places,
with one cluster of three persons in the same hotel and in
close contact.
The passenger with the first signs of infection on day
3 after his return and proven 2009 H1N1 Influenza was
probably infected during the bus trip. He did share the
hotel with the cluster of persons with fever during their
stay in Spain but had no other contact. He did not share
the hotel with the two persons with proven 2009 H1N1
Influenza. The other person who complained of cough
and arthralgia, but without fever, did not fall into the
case definition. Therefore, transmission of the 2009
H1N1 Influenza virus may have occurred in only 1/51
persons, with two proven index cases with fever and
coughing during the bus trip. This person did not sit in
close proximity to the two infected persons (see Fig. 1).
The index person sat at the opposite window and three
rows behind, the other infected person at the same
window seat but eight rows in front of the patient
becoming ill 3 days later. We calculated the risk of
transmission for laboratory confirmed symptomatic cases
as 1.96% (95% confidence interval 0–5.76%).
Discussion
Since April 2009, when the first cases of the 2009 H1N1
Influenza infections were identified, the pandemic has
spread throughout the world. Early studies reported a high
hospitalization rate, but with growing experience in dealing
with this new virus, it has become clear that the disease has
a relatively mild course in the majority of patients, with
most not requiring hospitalization [16]. However, in con-
trast to seasonal forms of Influenza A, young people are
more affected, and pregnant women are especially at risk
of developing severe disease. Consequently, rapid antiviral
treatment is recommended.
Fig. 1 Seating arrangements of passengers on the long distance bus
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The transmission rate of the 2009 H1N1 virus seems to be
higher than that of seasonal influenza [16], explaining its
rapid spread throughout the world. Health authorities have
warned that many segments of public life could be affected
(e.g., transportation, education, healthcare systems). For
hospitalized patients, guidelines are in place for dealing with
those individuals harboring the 2009 H1N1 virus, but outside
of hospitals or even in the ambulatory care setting, it has
often proven difficult to establish strict guidelines.
It is believed that most transmissions of influenza virus
occur via person-to-person or via droplets falling upon hard
surfaces where the virus can survive up to 48 h. However,
airborne transmission cannot be ruled out completely, and
small droplet nuclei containing influenza virus have been
found in waiting rooms in an emergency department [17].
The individuals investigated in this study were on the same
bus for more than 12 h, and at least two persons had
symptomatic documented 2009 H1N1 Influenza. Only one
other person developed H1N1 Influenza, resulting in a
transmission rate of 1.96%. The average age of our popu-
lation was 19.7 ± 7 years. Younger people are, in contrast
to seasonal influenza, more vulnerable to the 2009 H1N1
virus [18, 19]. Consequently, our data emphasize that air-
borne transmission may not be the main route of the spread
of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza virus. However, several
authors propose that in special situations, airborne trans-
mission of influenza virus may be underestimated [20].
Other pathogens that are usually transmitted by direct
contact can, under certain conditions, spread through the
air [21]. A significant increase in the dispersal as well as
transmission to patients and even outbreaks in hospital
wards have been demonstrated for Staphylococcus aureus
and linked to concomitant upper respiratory tract infection
in otherwise healthy nasal carriers [22–24]. This phenom-
enon is called ‘‘cloud adult’’ and was also proposed for
‘‘supersreaders’’ in the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) epidemic [25].
We believe that the situation of this long-distance bus
trip with a relatively low transmission rate cannot be
transferred directly to other public transport modes. It was
a night bus with just a few stops, and the passengers were
sleeping most of the time. Consequently, the movement of
passengers in the bus as well as boarding events were much
less frequent than those on a city bus or in a public train. As
the movements of passengers may facilitate the dispersion
of droplets to surfaces as well as person-to person contacts,
we postulate that the transmission rate on public transport
systems may be higher. However, in an outbreak of 2009
H1N1 Influenza in two school classes in the UK, there was
no evidence of transmissions on a school bus where the
children were exposed for more than 50 min to a symp-
tomatic case [26].
This investigation has its limitations. Some people
contract only mild or even asymptomatic 2009 H1N1
Influenza [27]. We contacted the passengers by telephone
only and did not investigate any further if the passenger
considered him/herself not to be ill. Thus, the real trans-
mission rate could have been higher. We postulate that one
person was infected during the bus trip, but transmission
even before boarding or shortly after the bus trip cannot be
completely ruled out.
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